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Chapter 3: THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE IRANIAN MODERN 
HISTORY 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, and following the diagnosis made by Hodgson (2002), 
Rodrik (2007), the World Development Reports (2005, 2015) and Easterly (2001, 2007a, 
2007b, 2014), this study aims to come up with a conceptual model uniquely tailored to the 
Iran-specific experiences of socio-economic development using a double-hermeneutics hybrid 
methodology. The main argument of this study revolves around the proposition that Iranian 
experience of socio-economic crises may be the outcome of failure to produce stable regime 
of truth (Foucault, 1980) because of the dynamic interplay between the context of culture and 
the context of situation, as formulated by Malinowski (1935: 73). Foucault (1980: 93-4) makes 
the following ground-breaking and astonishing observation:  
“In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we 
must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place”.  
In the case of Iran, the failure to produce truth seems to be at the heart of the failure to produce 
wealth. The failure to produce truth and wealth seems to be in turn rooted in the hyper-complex 
nature of the Iranian contexts. The composite notion of belated inbeteenness attempts to 
capture the Iran-specific nature of context of culture and context of situation.  
THE STATE OF BELATED INBETWEENNESS 
The two distinct notions of contexts can pave the way for delving deeper into the troubled 
relation between truth and wealth. In modern history of Iran, the ‘context of culture’ is 
characterized, in this work, by the notion of ‘inbetweenness’ and the ‘context of situation’ by 
the concept of ‘belatedness’ (Bhabha, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Huddart, 2006; Shayegan, 2007, 
1997; Byrne, 2009; Seeburger, 2016). In the following sections we address each of these 
notions separately and explore how they combine to create a state of confusion in the Iranian 
dasein, which further through cascading effects leads to the formation of unstable coalitions, 
dysfunctional institutions, and emergence of a chaotic order. 
INBETWEENNESS AND CULTURAL SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Various theorists have embarked on addressing the predicaments associated with the state of 
being trapped between contradictory cultural forces. For Shayegan (1997: ix, 77) the state of 
inbetweennes implies that: “we are situated on the fault-line between incompatible worlds”, 
“each of which marks a different ‘historical a priori’.” This state is further characterized by 
features like “inner contradictions”, “living in different periods of time” and missing “the 
crucial moments of history”. These inner contradictions, as Tavakoli-Targhi (2009: 5) 
observes, prompt “the emergence of a schizophrenic view of history and the formation of 
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schizophrenic social subjects” and breeds constant waves of resentment and discontent 
(Mansouri-Zeyni and Sami. 2014; Brah and Coombes, 2000). Shayegan (1997: 25) gives the 
example of possible contradictions between three systems of law (Sharia, customary or 
common law, and modern law) in the Moroccan context. The state of inbetweenness is 
alternatively dubbed as the state of cultural schizophrenia by Shayegan (1997) and is defined 
by de Alba (1995: 106) as  
“the presence of mutually contradictory or antagonistic beliefs, social forms, and 
material traits in any group whose racial, religious, or social components are a hybrid 
(or mestizaje) of two or more fundamentally opposite cultures”.  
Kraidy (2012: 238) reports the same phenomenon in Saudi Arabia, Merrell (2003: 189) in 
Mexico, Tejapira (2002: 210, 212-3) in Thailand, Visser (2008: 232) in China, Olesen (1995: 
227) in Afghanistan, Esposito (1999: 194) in Turkey, and Daniels (1985: 47) in Russia. 
Alongside Shayegan, Jahanbegloo (2004: xi), Ringer (2004: 47), Sadri (2004: 118), Tavakoli-
Targhi (2004: 132), and Tehranian (2004: 200) among others referred to various forms of 
cultural or national schizophrenia in Iran.  
Inbetweenness and hybridization 
The state of inbetweenness instigates incessant waves of processes of hybridization (Canclini, 
2005: xxvii) or grafting and patching operations (Shayegan, 1997: 60, 76) between the 
alternative forces (regimes of truth) leading to the emergence of numerous hybrid forms of 
voices, coalitions, institutions, discursive and non-discursive practices, and diverse forms of 
life32. Here we clearly distinguish the three notions of inbetweenness, denoting a state, 
hybridization33, which is a process, and hybridity, referring to the outcomes of the interaction 
between the state and the processes. These hybrid outcomes can survive and thrive or can go 
extinct or become dysfunctional and deformed or mutilated (Shayegan, 1997: 54) depending 
on whether they are products of reverse social engineering or the embedded outcomes of 
evolutionary processes of chaotic synchronization. These hybrid forms can be deemed as 
legitimate, bastard, monstrous, or zombie-like. Cultures (a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of life) and civilizations (institutionalized forms of life) are the by-product 
of the process of hybridization of alternative regimes of truth.  
Crucially, the state of inbetweenness has no significant resemblance to the phenomenon of 
multiculturalism in the West (Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994) - or its latest reincarnation in the 
                                                             
32 See also Shirazi (2018) for the application of the notion of ‘space-in-between’ to the Iranian 
architecture. In the following sections we address the question of why these processes of 
hybridization are inevitably triggered and how the features of “grafting and patching operations”, 
“living in different periods of time” and missing “the crucial moments of history” work themselves in 
the notions of “vanishing mediators” and “reverse social engineering”.  
33 Later on, we will explore how the notion of hybridization can be connected to the Deleuzian notion 
of rhizome (Colman, 2010) and the process philosophy in general.  
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notion of postsecularism (Calhoun et al., 2013, 2011) - due to the dominance of modernity in 
the Western context of culture and its stable institutionalization while being subject to 
incremental consensual changes. Even diaspora population immersed in their own particular 
form of state of inbetweenness face a fairly stable background in the Western context, which 
does not exist back in the homelands (for example in the case of legal systems or parliament 
or functioning banking system, hospitals, schools, police, and army, among others). Shayegan 
(1997: vii) emphasizes this point in the following terms: “The real tenor of this experience, in 
its current critical phase, hardly impinges on the Western consciousness. For the truth is that 
it is not a Western problem. The only people really qualified to draw attention to it are those 
who pay the price, in ‘unhappy consciousness.” Essentially, hybridization within a stable 
background with functional institutions, governance structures and price system, what 
Bauman (2000) dubbed as “liquid modernity”, is markedly different from hybridization within 
a fluid background, lacking institutional stability, functioning governance structures and 
working price system in almost all fields of life, work, and language. Postmodern forms of 
playful hybridization in the western and Japanese contexts, for instance, happen within stable 
institutionalized modern or hybrid backgrounds.   
In a larger global context, cultures and regimes of truth may converge, diverge, or mix 
(Pieterse, 2015: 60) and experience ‘convergent divergence’ (Gourevitch, 2003: 325; Taylor, 
2001: 185) or various forms and degrees of “glocalization” (Ritzer and Atalay 2010: 319) or 
‘disjunctive synthesis’ as Deleuze and Guattari (1984: 83) put it. Under various forms of 
pressures of hybridization, they may also collapse and become failed states. This produces our 
four types of societies: homogenous, heterogeneous, troubled, and failed, as mentioned before.  
Belatedness and cultural trauma 
Belatedness, as Clark (2001: 31) defines it, is “the feeling that one has come upon the literary 
or cultural scene after his or her time, or after all "significant" contributions have been made”. 
In the literature on socio-economic development (Chang, 2003; Easterly, 2007a, 2007b, 2014 
among others), the notions of a nation-state  being a “late-comer” to the development scene 
and the associated urge for “catching-up” with the pioneer nation-states and “leapfrogging” 
the state of backwardness captures the notion of belatedness (Yap and Rasiah, 2017; Lee, 
2016; Pieterse, 2010: 132). In the context of socio-economic development, belatedness, being 
late to the packaged truth of modernity and development, became interwoven with extreme 
trauma due to the catastrophic encounter with multiple manifestations of dark and bright faces 
of modernity (Hairi, 1987). In the Iranian modern context, modernity with its global bio-
politics and modes of governmentality has been frequently experienced as an overwhelming 
force (Juggernaut) and waves of floods through incessant encounters with its military, techno-
scientific, legal, economic, and cultural faces (Nasri, 2007; Vahdat, 2002). The traumatic 
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encounter with all contradictory manifestations of modernity as ‘dark light’ generated, as 
Mathee (2002) observes, the sense of “suspicion, fear and admiration” and instigated ‘politics 
of despair and resentment’ in the Iranian subject. The decadent and predatory nature of 
modernity alongside its glories of science, technology and rule of law prompted the senses of 
shock and awe, agony and ecstasy in the Iranian dasein (see for example the notion of post 
traumatic syndrome with regard to 1953 coup in Dabashi, 2010: 92). Belatedness (being late 
to modernity) is, as such, interwoven with trauma. To explore how this connection is 
established we need to briefly delve into the literature on trauma studies. 
Sztompka (2004) identifies traumatic events with four features of being sudden, 
comprehensive, fundamental, and unexpected. Heller (2007: 103) classifies three forms of 
traumas: structural (like the trauma of birth and death), historical (like Holocaust or slavery), 
individual (like cancer). Based on the works of Luckhurst (2008) and Latour (2004), Rothberg 
(2014: xi) maintains that “Trauma is perhaps best thought of not as any kind of singular object 
but rather … as ‘knots’ or ‘hybrid assemblages’ that ‘tangle up questions of science, law, 
technology, capitalism, politics, medicine and risk’.” The conception of trauma as a tangled 
object and a social assemblage fits well with Lacanian-Zizekian conceptions of three registers 
of real, symbolic, and imaginary and the characterization of their affirmative and negating 
dimensions in this study. This saves trauma studies from a lot of confusion and muddled 
theorization. Trauma is a sudden, drastic, unexpected and overwhelming event in its 
dimension of real and is entangled with science, religion, technology etc. in its provocation of 
perplexity and its resultant speech acts, and discursive and non-discursive practices associated 
with the truth claims of symbolic dimension, and myth, ideology and identity in its imaginary 
dimension.  
These three registers can be seen at work in the observation made by Faulkner (2007: 126): 
“According to Freud, the trauma results from a shock to the mental apparatus caused by a 
large quantum of stimulation for which one is insufficiently prepared. The repetition of this 
incursion in dreams, and the transference, represents a belated attempt to master the 
situation—to lay claim to the experience”. In effect, the real hits the social assemblage, the 
social assemblage tries to make sense of it and to explore various forms of “truth about it” 
through the typologies and classifications available in the symbolic order and to make a claim 
on it through packaging, naming, and appellation available in the imaginary order. The 
manifestation of belatedness emerging as trauma creates rupture in the fabric of time and 
partitions it into a ‘before and after’ structure. As Faulkner (2007: 126, footnote 11) observes 
“Trauma signals the beginning of temporality insofar as the subject is formed in relation to 
it”. Seeburger (2016) characterizes trauma by the inextricable interconnection of following 
four features: (1) belatedness, (2) excessiveness, (3) importunity, and (4) irremediability.  
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From the moments of drastic encounters with the incomprehensible comprehensiveness of 
modernity in the first half of 19th century, Iranian dasein has been struck by the excessiveness 
of the trauma of ‘development gap’ (Nasri, 2007; Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001) and has been ever 
since engaged belatedly to catch-up with it. With its excessiveness and belatedness, trauma 
challenges us to rethink thinking itself and drastically inspects our cherished and largely 
habitual and unconscious sets of associations embedded and sedimented in our background. 
Trauma, as Seeburger (2016: 172) reminds us, challenges the most fundamental categories of 
thought: life and death, identity and difference, sameness and otherness.  
Ultimately, “to think the disaster” may lead to the suspicion that the “disaster is thought” 
(Seeburger, 2016: 163). Seeburger (2016: 170) captures this feature in the notion of 
importunity. After 9/11, the Americans were importuned with the question of “why do they 
hate us so much?” (Faulkner, 2007: 129, footnote 24). In Iran, the question of “why are we 
backward?” has been importuned by the traumatic encounter with modernity in the last 200 
years. Seeburger (2016: 171) further adds that  
“ineluctable importunity of trauma also links into the incomprehensibility that, 
together with its comprehensiveness, constitutes trauma’s excessiveness”.  
 
Beyond the development gap, the state of belatedness for the Iranian dasein was rooted at the 
deeper level of traumatic encounter with modernity’s radical otherness as a novel regime of 
truth. This phenomenon is dubbed as cultural trauma (Alexander et al., 2004; Smelser, 2004) 
in the literature on trauma studies.  Meek (2016: 30) sees it in the following terms:  
“Cultural trauma is composed of images and narratives that convey the impact and 
threat of catastrophe on large populations”.  
As Neria and Ataria (2016: 394) put it  
“major events such as the Holocaust, the Vietnam War, and the 9/11 attacks have the 
potential to penetrate the core of societies, transforming basic ways of intellectual 
functioning, and overhauling their cultural infrastructures”.  
As such, cultural trauma can lead to the crisis of meaning and identity. Eyerman (2004: 63) 
attests that: “A traumatic tear evokes the need to “narrate new foundations”, prompting the 
emergence of what Sztompka (2004: 160) calls a “whole “meaning industry”. 
The bewildering and overwhelming nature of encounter with cultural trauma of modernity 
manifests itself in the epoch-making emergence of incomprehensible comprehensiveness of 
an almost fully shaped novel regime of truth, representing a radically different grid of 
intelligibility. As Zizek (2008: 13, original emphasis) reminds us  
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“[A] true historical break does not simply designate the ‘repressive’ loss (or 
‘progressive’ gain) of something, but the shift in the very grid which enables us to 
measure losses and gains”.  
Faulkner (2007: 134, original emphasis) captures how trauma is deeply rooted in our 
encounter with the other:  
“our difference from one another is essentially traumatic. We affect one another from 
another place- the unanticipated and uncanny outside (what Lacan will call ‘the 
Real’) that nonetheless wields the authority of inevitability upon us. … Lacan 
contends, psychoanalysis is at bottom an ethical enquiry that attempts to negotiate the 
relation between the self and the other, by interrogating the site of their encounter in 
the trauma. This otherness, the real, is both revealed and occulted by the trauma”.  
This insightful passage captures the nature of 200-year ambiguity and confusion of the Iranian 
traumatic encounter with modernity.  
Crucially, cultural trauma can be transmitted from one generation to the next through common 
narratives (Heller, 2007: 114)34 and can “fuel cycles of retraumatization” (Vermeulen, 2014: 
145) through continuous exposure to the source of trauma or continuous failure to ‘work 
through’ it. As such, trauma can be continuous as well as sudden. As Vermeulen (2014: 144) 
puts it trauma can be a continuum for the vulnerable groups and communities.  
In the same spirit, Ifowodo (2013: 21) refers to colonialism and post-colonialism as traumatic 
processes:  
“At the very least, we must acknowledge that the historical trauma caused by 
colonialism created a radically altered sense of self for the colonized and causes the 
postcolonial subject, even now, to pose to him or herself, consciously or 
unconsciously, the question, “In reality, who am I?”  
As such, in an excessively vulnerable context of belatedness, cultural trauma of encounter 
with modernity can be both a sudden event and a continuous process. The exposure to all 
diverse faces of modernity alongside its deepest transformative and terrifying kernel has 
been the source of cycles of re-traumatization in the modern history of Iran, manifested in 
strong and weak events of the Iranian modern history alongside the traumatic experience of 
dysfunctionality and deformity in all realms of life, work and language. 
Kamrava (2018: 52) addresses the same phenomenon under the broader notion of “human 
security” and sees the troubles of the Middle East region having deep roots in the serious 
threats and challenge posed to the human security in that region. Belatedness trigger the 
transformative and endemic sense of traumatic insecurity associated with the erosion of 
cultural identity. Halliday (1990: 248) finds that  
                                                             
34 See also Schwab, 2010, for the notion of ‘transgenerational trauma’ and DeGruy, 2005, for the 
notion of ‘post traumatic slave syndrome’. 
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“this supposedly paranoid streak” in the political culture of modern Iran have “its 
historical national roots” in traumatic experiences of “external interventions”, “just 
as the anxiety and illusions of individuals can have roots in their own earlier 
traumatic experiences”.  
This can be related to the notion of “cultural trauma” developed by Alexander et al. (2004: 
1) as “a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon the consciousness of members of 
a collectivity, and changes their identity fundamentally and irrevocably”. The continuous 
encounter with various faces of modernity acted as a form of stretched event, leaving its 
horrendous scars on the Iranian forms of individuality and collectivity. As such, after the 
humiliating defeats of the 19th century in the hands of the Russians and the British and the 
subsequent chain of events, the last 200 years of Iranian history forms a Deleuzian single 
series (Young, 2013: 96, 282; see also Katouzian, 2004: 34; Akhavi, 1998: 695; Arjomand, 
1988: 30, for the potent sense of humiliation in shaping the different episodes of the Iranian 
modern history).  
Alexander et al. (2004) further identify that the event per se does not cause trauma but is 
mediated by its representation. The gap between event and its representation is bridged by 
“trauma process” involving “carrier groups” like elites, intellectuals, clergies, poets and 
artists involving in the creation of negative meanings associated with the triggering events. 
This is a Lacanian process of encounter with the real and its ensuing symbolic and imaginary 
registers. This process generates a series of traumas, paradoxes, and myths associated with a 
particular set of events like the Russo-Iranian wars or Iran hostage crisis or the whole 
stretched event of encounter with modernity (see Mobasher, 2012, for the trauma of the 
Islamic Revolution for the exiled Iranians, for instance).    
The traumatic experience of belatedness creates what Fanon calls the “zone of occult 
instability” (Ifowodo, 2013: 14), and what Chakrabarty (2011: 168) calls the ‘now’ 
imagination (as opposed to the ‘not-yet’ imagination) and instigates waves of acting-out in the 
form of various episodes of reverse social engineering in order to stop and reverse the 
excruciating pains associated with zone of occult instability and its associated development 
gap, and to escape from a world that seems ‘nasty, brutish and short’. As Ifowodo maintains,  
“The occult, if we must spell it out, suggests not only the supernatural but also that 
which is not easily apprehended or understood-indeed, that which is concealed or 
occluded from us under normal modes of inquiry”.  
Fanon calls for taking a psychoanalytic position (Ifowodo, 2013: 25), which requires the art 
of listening to the free associations of all sides of the traumatic experience, namely, the 
colonizer and the colonized, the perpetrator and the victim, the self and the other. 
Belated inbetweenness and tragedy of confusion 
58 
 
Overall, while the state of inbetweenness makes us exposed to schizophrenia, the state of 
belatedness makes us vulnerable to various episodes of reverse social engineering and acting-
out. The state of ‘inbetweenness’ has manifested itself in the modern history of Iran in the 
state of bewilderment and perplexity, grasped via the notion of ‘tragedy of confusion’. This 
notion is designed to capture the urgent and pressing sense of being torn between warring 
regimes of truth35. The modern history of Iran appears to be littered with ample evidence of 
tragedy of confusion. The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beg (Siyahatnameh-ye Ibrahim Beig) 
(Maraghaʼi, 2006) written at the end of the 19th century and one of the texts behind the 
Constitutional Revolution captures, as reported in Nasri (2007: 89, see also Sohrabi, 2012: 
121-3), the Iranian state of confusion succinctly:  
everywhere the landscape is disturbed (ashofteh), people disturbed, commerce 
disturbed, imagination disturbed, beliefs disturbed, city disturbed, king disturbed, oh 
God, why is there so much disturbance [everywhere]?  
This description seems to be applicable to almost all episodes of Iranian modern history- as 
Movahhed (1999, 2004) uses the notion of “confused (or disturbed) dreams (khab-e ashofteh)” 
to characterize the ONM, affirming Ibrahim Beig’s insight on the nature of Iranian modern 
social reality- barring for the rare and fleeting moments of manifestation of “perfectly unified 
collective will” (Foucault, as reported in Afaray et al., 2005: 95) or rare cases of institutional 
stability. About a century after Ibrahin Beig, Simin Daneshvar (1993, 2001), the prominent 
Iranian novelist, explores the same themes of “disturbance”, ‘bewilderment’, ‘perplexity’ and 
‘confusion’ in her trilogy “Wandering Island (Jazireh-ye Sargardani)”, “Wandering Cameleer 
(Sareban-e Sargardan)”, and “Wandering Mountain (Koh-e Sargardan)”. Iran alongside its 
leaders, citizens, groups, parties, organizations, and institutions seems to be trapped in the 
state of confusion.    
The state of belatedness, on the other hand, refers to the state where Iranian social order has 
found itself dwarfed by the shocking arrival of modernity, positioning it in the state of catching 
up (Abramovitz, 1986) and outside-in (rather than inside-out) model of evolution and 
development. The interaction between these two states is captured in the theoretical model 
proposed in this study as articulated in the following sections and in the previous and next 
chapters. This model starts from the level of mind as a social institution, as elaborated by 
Arkoun (2006) and the transaction-cost economist, Williamson (2000), and explores the 
implications of the specific characteristics of Iranian mind and preference structure in an 
attempt to develop a multi-level (micro, meso and macro) dynamic model in fulfilling the aim 
of this study. 
                                                             
35 See a similar, but less theorized, Weberian concept of “war of gods” or “collision of values” (Lowy, 
1996: 2) and its application in the Latin America. 
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Proposed Conceptual Model 
The proposed conceptual model can be expressed in the following way: Tragedy of confusion 
emanates from the state of inbetweenness with its associated confused preference structure, as 
Iranians have been captivated by three rival regimes of truth and identity markers of Islam, 
Persianism (the idea of pre-Islamic Iran), and western modernity. The state of inbetweenness 
in its interaction with the state of belatedness prompts the translation of three regimes of truth 
into three projects of social engineering, namely, ‘Persianization’, Islamization, and 
modernization in order to achieve social transformation to fill the development gap and repair 
its associated waves of identity crisis. 
Reverse social engineering requires the formation of collective will and collective action, 
which through formation of stable coalitions could achieve its goals. But in the state of 
confusion the formation of such coalitions is almost impossible. This leads to a phenomenon 
described as ‘situational impossibility theorem’ in this study, indicating that in the complex 
interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness (hence, belated 
inbetweenness) it is impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work and 
language to achieve the desired social transformations (we will see why later). This leads to 
turning Iran into a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro 
levels.  This in turn results in the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘institutional failure’ in 
the form of inability to construct stable and functional institutions such as modern nation-state, 
or market economy based on property rights or any other stable forms of institutional 
structures, which turns Iran into the country of institutional dysfunctionalities and deformities. 
The accumulated experiences of ‘tragedy of confusion’, ‘formation of unstable coalitions’ and 
‘institutional failure’ lead to the emergence of a society immersed in a state of ‘chaotic order’.   
The state of chaotic order  can be explained in the following terms: the experience of tragedy 
of confusion with its associated instability of coalitions and institutional dysfunctionalities 
frequently leads to the emergence of widespread sense of discontent and disillusionment, in 
turn, triggering the emergence of large- and small-scale social movements and revolutions 
culminating in the experience of constant waves of socio-political instability, where the 
society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from 
irreconcilable differences between and within various social assemblages in the springs of 
freedom, and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. In this process, the order 
is restored based on the emergence of a final arbiter or the Iranian leviathan as the evolved 
coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution leading to socio-economic crises and 
stagnation. 





This chapter strives to come up with a country-specific model of Iranian experience of socio-
economic development in the last 200 years. This model relies on the two notions of 
belatedness and inbetweenness. Their meanings and application to the Iranian context is 
explored based on the theoretical insights from a multitude of disciplines. It is shown that the 
process of hybridization in a stable background is different from unstable background, which 
produces four types of societies. Inbetweenness is related to being torn between contradictory 
forces and belatedness is related to the pressures and urgencies associated with the need to 
catch-up with pioneer societies. The relation between belatedness and trauma is explored. 
Trauma as shock is related to the notion of unpreparedness. Four features of traumas were 
explored and shown how traumatic events can turn into a process and be transmitted 
intergenerationally and turn into a deeper problem in the shape of cultural traumas, where the 
collective and personal identities and meanings are violently questioned and deeply shaken. 
At its deepest level the other is experienced as traumatic, which induces a sense of 
identitylessness. In the traumatic encounter with modernity, Iran started from a series of 
military defeats and woke up to the development gap and travelled deeper into cultural trauma 
and crisis in meaning, and ultimately experiencing the radical other as traumatic. The 
implications of the state of belated inbetweenness turns Iranian modern history in the last 200 
years into a single series encompassing “haunting legacies, violent histories, and 
transgenerational trauma” (Schwab, 2010), or what Limbert (2009) calls “the ghosts of 
history”, mediated by tragedy of confusion in the zone of occult instability and the emergence 
of a ‘now’ consciousness triggering waves of reverse social engineering as a way of ‘acting 
out’.  
